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Abstract
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In this paper, I am using panel data of merged datasets that include coffee bean hectares
of cultivation, coca leaf cultivation, massacres, and selective assassinations to study the
relationship between coffee bean production and the level of homicide rates in Colombia during
2002-2010. This is a departmental level analysis across six coffee-growing departments:
Antioquia, Caldas, Cauca, Huila, Tolima, and Cauca Valley. I use a fixed effect regression
model to analyze the relationship between coffee bean production, coca leaf production and the
two types of homicides. My results do not show a direct link between coffee bean production
and levels of homicides reported. However, there is a significant negative correlation between
the dummy year variables and both types of homicides. Thus, demonstrating that other factors
had a significant influence on the reduction of homicides across the 8 years, such as the election
of a new president and the establishment of international coffee prices. Moreover, the results
also show that encouraging farmers to cultivate an alternative crop is not always enough to
completely halt the cultivation of coca crops. Most of the literature on coffee bean production
and crime rate, studies general crime in Colombia during one period of time or before the years
2000. My study adds to the current literature by analyzing the effect of coffee bean cultivation
on specific crimes, massacres and selective assassinations, across the years 2002-2010.

Coffee Bean, Coca Leaf, and Crime in Colombia
I. Introduction
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A never-ending war between drugs and poverty in Colombia has plagued the lives of
many rural farmers who have dedicated their livelihood to cultivating coffee beans. The war on
illicit drugs has invited foreign aid to try to stop the cultivation of these product. Historically,
the cultivation of coffee beans and coca crop were two of the leading exports in Colombia. 1 The
coffee bean crop is major agricultural export that provides high employment to many rural
Colombian households. 2 Additionally, coffee bean and coca leafs cultivation in similar
environments. Both crops require certain components in order to thrive such as high altitudes,
moderate temperatures, rainfall, humidity, and volcanic soil. 3 Nevertheless, with the rise of
armed organizations and government conflicts, one product became more financially attractive
than the other.
The relationship between coffee bean cultivation and crime rates in Colombia is a topic
that Colombian scholars have researched in depth; however, they have focused on general crime
rates and not specific crimes. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of coffee bean
cultivation on homicidal crime rates on a departmental level analysis in Colombia. In order to
understand the relationship between coffee beans and crime, one must first understand the
connection between coffee bean cultivation and coca leaf cultivation. In addition, one must also
understand the connection between coca leaves and crime to understand the overall link between
coffee bean farmers and violence in Colombia. The overall question I seek to answer is whether
or not coffee bean production has a significant effect on rates of homicide within Colombia.

1
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largest producers of coffee beans in the world. The high production of coffee beans might also
explain the high levels of crime within the country. Foreign military aid from the United States
to Colombia has amounted to over 9 billion dollars since 2000 (Plan Colombia, n.d). The U.S.
joined forces with the Colombian government through an international policy called Plan
Colombia to alleviate human rights violations and end drug-trafficking through military means
(Plan Colombia, n.d.). Many scholars, policy officials, and activist have criticized the
effectiveness of the overall program, and many wish to end the policy because it has not
accomplished what it had promised to do (U.S. Policy in Colombia, n.d.). As the U.S. continues
to pour aid into Colombia’s drug-stricken economy, it is worth researching an alternative method
that could possibly reduce the coca crop production and end the fuel to crimes.
In my study, I use datasets from the Colombian Coffee Grower’s Federation and the
Empirical Studies of Conflict database to collect data on coffee bean hectares of cultivation, coca
leaf hectares of cultivation, massacres cases, and selective assassinations cases. I use a fixed
effects regression model to analyze the relationship between coffee bean production and coca
leaf production to the homicide rates over the course of 2002-2010. My overall results suggest
that there is no significant correlation between coffee bean production and homicide rates, and
no significant correlation between coca leaf production and homicide rates. Although my
analysis does not prove a significant correlation between the agricultural products and crime, it
does shed some light on the effectiveness of Plan Colombia, a policy that encourages farmers to
grow an alternative crop over growing coca crops that fuels the civil conflict in Colombia. An
alternative crop is not enough to halt the cultivation of coca leaf production; thus more research
is needed to make Plan Colombia an effective policy.

Coffee Bean, Coca Leaf, and Crime in Colombia
I propose to answer my research question in 5 sections. In section 2, I will provide a
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brief background on Colombia’s armed conflict. In section 3, I will provide a review of the
literature related to my topic. Section 4 will address the methodology of my data and the results.
Finally, section 5 will provide my concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.

II. Background
To understand Colombia’s current issues, it is important to know about the political
history that has shaped its economy. Colombia’s civil conflict between armed groups and the
government initiated during the period called “La Violencia”, 4 and it manifested into a war that
has lasted over 50 years (Paterson, 2014). This ordeal began with the assassination of a liberal
presidential candidate, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan Ayala, a beloved candidate that supported the poor
communities of Colombia (Paterson, 2014). During this period, a violent outbreak separated a
country between liberals, conservatives, and communists. In the midst of the outbreak, poor
rural farmers joined small groups in order to protect their lands against those who imposed on
them. The presence of communism in Colombia put the U.S. on edge; therefore, any political
party that was not liberal or conservative was automatically considered communist by both
governments (Paterson, 2014).
Marxist ideologies formed the foundation for the uprising of peasant farmers, also known
as the guerilla, thus they armed themselves with weapons and became mobile in order to protect
their livelihood against opposing forces (Paterson, 2014). These opposing forces, also known as
the paramilitary groups, became defendants of large landowners, drug traffickers, and
businessmen. In order for these two groups to thrive and continue their operations, they sought

4
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murders, bombings, extortion, and drug-trafficking (Paterson, 2014). What once started as a
peasant farmer movement evolved into civil war between armed groups and the Colombian
government.
The trafficking of drugs from Latin America to the western world became the main
source of income for those involved with the trade (Holmes et al., 2006). During the 80's,
cocaine became extremely popular in the U.S., and because coca leaves are the main ingredient
in producing cocaine, it provided economic incentives for farmers to cultivate high quantities of
it (Paterson, 2014). Nevertheless, the U.S. pressured the Colombian government to eradicate the
cultivation of coca leaves. Eradicating a traditional native crop resulted in a backlash from many
rural communities. Coca leaves have a historical presence in the Andean region, mainly because
it is an important part of the indigenous tribe’s daily diet (History of the Coca Plant, n.d). As the
Colombian government initiated eradication actions throughout the country, with the help of the
U.S., coca leaf became an illegal product to cultivate (Miroff, 2015).
As the conflicts continued, many families were forced to migrate away from their homes
while others joined the movement to avoid conflict. The drug trade fueled many of the armed
groups operations. Holmes et al. (2006) quotes that the power of guerilla groups is linked with
the control of the drug market. Furthermore, Rangel (1998) (as cited in Holmes et al., 2006)
states that more than half of FARC’s income is funded through drug operations and one third of
their members are dedicated to coca related activities. 5 Many of these armed groups are involved
with the homicides that occur in Colombia. In the following literature review, I will explain how
their violent presences has affected Colombia’s overall agricultural economy.

5
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The following literature review is structured in the following manner. I will begin by
discussing the relationship between coffee bean cultivation and coca leaf cultivation. After, I
will discuss the relationship between coca leaf cultivation and crime rate. Lastly, I will discuss
the literature review in regards to the overall connection between coffee bean production and
homicide rate. The table below visually shows the flow between the three categories.

Coffee Bean Cultivation

Coca Leaf Cultivation - Armed Conflict

Departmental Crime Rates
A. Coffee Bean-Coca Crops
Garcia-Yi (2014) analyzes certified organic coffee bean production as an alternative
development policy to reduce coca leaf cultivation in Peru. In the study, she clarifies that coffee
bean crops are a perfect substitute to coca leaf crops, thus she surveys the district of San Pedro
de Putina Punco located in the upper Tambopata valley, where the land is high in altitude and
rich in precipitation and sunlight. This is a unique location that she samples because the local
farmers cultivate both coffee bean and coca leaf as sources of income. The purpose of her
survey is to find out how effective an organic coffee certified program is in order to curve the
cultivation of coca bushes, per household (Garcia-Yi, 2014). The results demonstrate that
certified organic coffee had a significant negative effect on coca leaf production; however, only
farmers with large hectares of land, higher plots in altitude, farming experience, and with leveled

Coffee Bean, Coca Leaf, and Crime in Colombia
terrain are more likely to partake in certified coffee programs (Garcia-Yi, 2014). The farmers
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without these specific qualities are at a disadvantage since growing organic coffee requires
experience, time, and land as demonstrated through this study. Yet, the reward for cultivating
organic coffee is highly based on its retail price.
Certified organic coffee bean has a retail price based on its quality; therefore, the farmer
has a high bargaining power over the product. Certified organic coffee has a price premium of
about 16 percent above the market price, thus making organic coffee bean cultivation more
attractive to the small-scale farmers that can afford the cost of producing organically (Garcia-Yi,
2014). In order to have organic coffee certification, the farmer must first go through a three-year
process of cleaning his soil from pesticide and other chemicals used on the soil for cultivation
(Garcia-Yi, 2014). Thus, the farmers who can afford to go through the process and pay the
certification fee will have a comparative advantage over those who cannot. As a result, Garcia-Yi
(2014) suggests that an increase in income will influence a farmer to cultivate more certified
coffee beans and fewer coca leaves.
Garcia-Yi (2014) focuses primarily on organic coffee cultivation, and this is a limitation
to my study because Colombia cultivates non-organic coffee beans. The Colombian Coffee
Growers Federation (FedCafe) provides data on non-organic coffee beans that small scale
farmers cultivate, and they pride themselves of their unique product that is cultivated on
Colombian soil (Federación Nacional De Cafeteros. 2014). As a result, organic coffee beans
provide the Peruvian farmer bargaining power over their harvest, while the Colombian farmer
has to settle for the price that FedCafe offers. The introduction of organic coffee beans into the
Colombian market, in addition to the traditional coffee bean crop, may influence farmers to
cultivate more coffee beans over coca leaves.

Coffee Bean, Coca Leaf, and Crime in Colombia
Coca leaves also maintain a high retail price after the leaf has been processed and
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converted to cocaine. Miron (2003) analyzes the retail prices of cocaine on the black and legal
market in the United States. Miron (2003) utilizes data from 1998 to analyze the ratios of farm
gate and retail price of several legal and illegal goods. Coffee beans produced in Colombia had a
retail ratio of 3-3.5 times that of the farm gate price (Miron, 2003), meaning that the farm gate
price of a pound of coffee in Colombia was worth about $0.75 U.S. dollars. The retail price of
roasted coffee beans in Boston was worth about $2.60 per pound (Miron, 2003). Furthermore, a
cup of fresh coffee would have had a ratio of 29-34 times of the farm gate price per pound of
coffee beans. Meanwhile, the farm gate price of coca leaves was priced at $0.36 - $0.57 per the
required amount to produce one gram of pure cocaine, as for the retail ratio of cocaine was 262
times the farm gate prices for coca leaves (Miron, 2003). On average, the black market price for
cocaine was $122 while the price for a pound of roasted coffee was only about $2.60. Miron
(2003) obtained the legal price for cocaine through research and pharmaceutical companies who
purchase cocaine, thus he estimates that black market prices would be similar to the legal
markets prices, if not more. This means that as long as government eradication efforts continue,
the retail price of cocaine will continue to increase, based on the simple supply and demand
model. A shift in supply will result in higher retail market prices for cocaine. If farmers sought
a source of higher income based on market prices, they would be more likely to cultivate the
crop with the highest returns (Ibanez & Martinsson, 2013). Therefore, the cultivation of an
alternative crop, such as coffee, must first provide sufficient profit incentive in order to reduce
coca production.
Income plays a significant role when farming a certain crop because if a farmer cannot
gain sufficient income to cover the cost of production, whether coffee bean is organic or not, that
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study utilizing a survey-based experiment in four municipalities of Putumayo, Colombia.
Putumayo is one of the highest growing coca regions in Colombia, thus it is an ideal setting to
collect information from local farmers (Ibanez & Martinsson, 2013). The purpose of Ibanez and
Carlsson (2010)’s study is to determine the effectiveness of Colombia’s coca eradication policy
and the alternative development programs. The survey-based experiment evaluates the behavior
of the farmers given a hypothetical scenario. The participants would decide how many hectares
of land they would dedicate to coca cultivation based on the profit of an alternative crop and the
probability of eradication. Additionally, they use a behavioral model of crime where they
analyze the effects of morality, legitimacy, and social interactions (Ibanez & Carlsson, 2010).
Ibanez and Carlsson (2010) demonstrate that an increase in the profit of the alternative
crop and an increase in risk of eradication will significantly decrease coca cultivation and
hectares dedicated to the illicit crop (Ibanez & Carlsson, 2010). They conclude that in order for
a policy to be effective, the policy has to target certain farmers based on their perceptions of coca
eradication risk and profits from an alternative crop. These perceptions vary within the
municipality, thus targeting the perceived risk levels of eradication and profit levels of an
alternative crop can be very effective in implementing a policy that can curb coca cultivation.
Ibanez and Carlsson (2010), along with Garcia-Yi (2014)’s research emphasizes the importance
of profit of an alternative crop, such as coffee, in order to substitute coca crops in Latin America.
An interesting observation made by Ibanez & Carlsson (2010) is that farmers with large land
holdings are less likely to cultivate coca crops, but could afford to use their land to cultivate
larger areas of coca crops if needed (Ibanez & Carlsson, 2010). This observation coincides with

Coffee Bean, Coca Leaf, and Crime in Colombia
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likely to cultivate certified organic coffee.
Although Ibanez & Carlsson (2010) focus their research on a Colombian coca growing
municipality, they do not offer coffee bean crops as a hypothetical alternative crop to the farmers
interviewed in their survey. Thus, if they would have included coffee bean as an option for the
farmer, their results could have been different because coffee farmers have the support of
FedCafe. This is one main limitation of Ibanez & Carlsson (2010)’s survey based experiment on
coca growing farmers.
Finally, an observation made by Ibanez and Carlsson (2010) is farmers’ sensitivity to the
levels of eradication risk. Previous literature has linked negative responses to government efforts
to eradicate coca crops. The government’s effort to eradicate coca crops, in most cases, triggers
high levels of violence in rural areas (Palacios, 2010). Therefore, to understand the overall
connection between coffee bean cultivation and crime rates in Colombia, one must also
understand the relationship between coca crop eradication and crime rates. In the first section of
the literature review, I established that coffee beans and coca leaves are substitute crops, and that
farmers are more willing to cultivate coca crops if the market price and environmental conditions
are right. In the following section I will establish the link between coca crops and crime rates in
Colombia.
B. Coca Crops-Crime Rate
Coca leaf cultivation is linked to armed conflict organizations that profit from the end
product, cocaine (Palacios, 2010). Historically, organizations against the Colombian
conservative political party have gained power and land by terrorizing small land farmers and
associating themselves with drug traffickers (Holmes et al., 2006). As seen in the background

Coffee Bean, Coca Leaf, and Crime in Colombia
section, the relationship between armed organizations and drug traffickers is not a simple one.

12

Armed groups either grow, process, sell, tax traffickers, or do all with the drugs manufactured
(Paterson, 2014). This is why it is difficult to establish a direct link when there are many links
between armed groups and drug cartels. However, Angrist and Kuglar (2008) establish that coca
production and eradication perpetuates Colombia’s civil conflict.
Previous literature has identified a relationship between coca leaf cultivation with the
level of crime rate in Colombia. Initially, Holmes et al. (2006) state that according to the
literature they analyzed, on a national level, there appears to be a positive trend between coca
production and violence. However, they want to shed light on departmental figures in
comparison to the overall national figure, and demonstrate that there is no correlation between
coca production and human right violations in Colombia. They analyze departmental level data
from 1991-2001, and they utilize four different lenses in order to determine the correlation
between violence and coca production. These four lenses include: historical analysis,
cartographic visualization, analytic trend in four high producing coca departments and four
violent departments, and a departmental-level fixed effects model (Holmes et al., 2006). The
historical analysis provides the context of government presence in Colombia’s civil war. They
argue that a lack of government presence in impoverished communities allowed rebel
organizations to establish power roots. As a result, many citizens, rich and poor, were victims of
the civil war that ripped the country apart. The cartographic visualization presents pie graphs
that show the presence of coca production, internal displacement, and human rights violation on
behalf of guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, etc. on maps of Colombia (Holmes et al., 2006).
From the four lenses, it is worth focusing on the analytical trends of the eight
departments. The first four departments Caqueta, Guaviare, Putumayo, Meta are known to have
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Antioquia, Bolivar, Cauca, and Santander are known to have the highest rates of violence in
Colombia (Holmes et al., 2006). Holmes et al. (2006) analysis reveal that coca production alone
does not trigger violence in these departments, but rather violence is influenced by other
variables in each department. These variables include coca eradication surfaces, human right
violations on behalf of public forces (military or police officials), poverty rates, and
unemployment rates (Holmes et al., 2006). These observations are then taken a step further by
controlling unobservable variables in a fixed effect model. The authors utilize a panel dataset in
order to analyze the change of violence rate over the three years for each department. As a result
of the leftist guerilla group, the dependent variable in the regression model is human rights
violation. The independent variables are homicides, displaced people, coca eradication, coca
cultivation, human rights violation by public forces and paramilitaries, population, GDP growth
rate, exports, poverty, and unemployment rates. The results state that levels of violence are
positively correlated with government efforts to eradicate coca plots, which means that coca
eradication efforts trigger violence in these eight departments, and not coca leaf production as
initially stated on the national level.
Holmes et al. (2006) findings reveal the effects of coca production on the rates of
violence which contributes to my overall research question. My research question includes the
relationship between coca leaf hectares and homicide rates. According to their results, coca does
not have a significant effect on human rights violation, which is a broad term not specified.
Contrary to Holmes et al. (2006)’s model, my dependent variable will be the number of
homicides dependent on coca leaf hectares of production. In their analysis, homicides stand as an

Coffee Bean, Coca Leaf, and Crime in Colombia
independent variable and its analysis lacks further research, henceforth I will be analyzing
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homicides more closely.
Further into Holmes et al. (2006)’s research, they attest that as long as the effort to
eradicate coca crops persists, armed groups will continue to have a negative response towards
eradication. These negative responses come in the form of assassinations, kidnappings,
massacres, property damages, etc. (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2012). Of the list of
responses, I will be analyzing assassinations and massacres, further discussed in the
methodology section. Holmes et al. (2006) claim that U.S. alleviating poverty policy
intervention is counterproductive to Colombia’s economy, and suggest that a more effective
policy would be to promote a “non-traditional, labor intensive export” (Holmes et al., 2006). I
agree with the statement that U.S. policy interventions is not as effective as they intended to be,
thus an effective policy would be to incentivize farmers to cultivate an alternative crop, not
necessarily non-traditional. As understood in Ibanez and Carlsson (2010)’s and Garcia-Yi
(2014)’s research, farmers are more responsive to profit maximizing cultivation options than risk
of crop eradication.
Angrist and Kuglar (2008) define coca crops as the resource curse since coca is a
resource of wealth that leaves behind a trail of civil unrest and hinders economic development.
In the first portion of their research, they look at various characteristics of coca growing farmers
and determine that coca production increases income for males. Nevertheless, their analysis also
suggest that those highly affected by the violence are young and older males. Indeed, this
resource curse fuels the violence of Colombia’s civil conflict, and it provides the funding for
armed groups to terrorize the public. Further into their analysis, Angrist and Kuglar (2008)
analyze the violent deaths in rural and urban locations of coca growing versus non coca growing
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regions. In the same regions, they analyze whether or not the regions had an early presence of
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guerilla and paramilitary groups. This is important to their study because they predict that an
early presence of either groups would influence their overall results thus they observe data
between the years 1994-2000. Angrist & Kuglar (2008)’s results establish that as coca
cultivation increases so does violent death rates in coca growing regions. This is significant to
my own research because it makes that connection between coca production and crimes
committed on behalf of armed organizations. The data I will be analyzing are violent death rates
committed by guerilla and paramilitary groups. Interestingly enough, my data provides a third
party that is also responsible for violent deaths, the public force. 6 Therefore, my research will
add to Angrist & Kuglar (2008)’s analysis on coca production and violent death rates.
Ibanez and Martinsson (2013) publish another study that analyzes the curbing of coca
cultivation in Putumayo, Colombia. In this study they analyze the effectiveness of eradication
policies based on the farmer’s behavioral response to anti-drug policies. They primarily focus on
the farmer’s moral cost of producing coca, hence the moral cost involved is environmental
damages and levels of violence due to coca production (Ibanez & Martinsson, 2013). A framed
field experiment is utilized to measure the participants’ behavior. They provided each
participant ten points that represent land, labor, and capital. They were then given nine different
government policy scenarios, in which they needed to allocate their resources effectively in order
to cultivate either coca or cattle. Their results demonstrate that only 26 percent of their
participants considered the moral cost of coca production when making their investment
decisions. Thus, Ibanez and Martinsson (2013) suggested that increasing the public’s awareness
of the moral cost associated with coca cultivation would create an effective policy to reduce coca

6
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production. Again, Ibanez and Martinsson (2013) fail to acknowledge coffee bean production as
the alternative option and instead suggest cattle as the alternative, but do not explain why.
Based on Holmes et al. (2006)’s, Angrist and Kugler (2008)’s, and Ibanez and
Martinsson (2013)’s arguments I assume that coca leaf production and eradication fluctuate the
level of crime rates reported in the different departments of Colombia. If there is an increase in
coca leaf production, then the alternative substitute crop coffee beans is negatively impacted.
Garcia- Yi (2014), amongst other authors, suggest that a solution to Colombia coca cultivation
problem, should be to promote an alternative method that is a labor intensive item of export, in
order to decrease coca cultivation instead of forcing eradication and alleviating violence. The
purpose of my paper is to demonstrate that the ideal alternative production is indeed coffee
beans.
C. Coffee Bean-Crime Rate
In the past two sections I looked at the two relationships between coffee bean cultivation
and coca leaf cultivation, and the connection between coca leaf productions and levels of crime
rate. In this final section of the literature review, I will establish the overall connection between
coffee bean production and the levels of crime. There is limited research on the connection of
these two concepts, but the following articles provide an academic overview of this relationship.
Coffee bean cultivation and levels of crime are two unique characteristics to Colombia.

Since the 1940’s, Colombia has been plagued with civil conflict because of the outbreak between
the Liberal and Conservative political parties. Yet, the impact of armed conflict on coffee bean
cultivation has become more prominent in the last twenty years. In a case study done in
Colombia, Munoz-Mora (2010) states that armed conflict in 1985 was hardly present in the
coffee growing regions. Ten years later, armed conflict was present in 58 percent of coffee
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growing regions of Colombia (Muñoz-Mora, 2010). The presence of armed conflict in these
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regions have demonstrated inefficiency and hindrance on economic growth for coffee farmers
(Muñoz-Mora, 2010). Abruption of violence has plagued many poor farmers, and many of them
are forced to leave their farms and start a new beginning in the nearest city (Holmes et al., 2006).
Munoz-Mora (2010) case study, originally written in Spanish, seeks to identify the
impact of violence on coffee bean production and its farming efficiency. As the presence of
armed organization increased in coffee growing regions, farmers tended to diversify their sources
of income and many of them resorted to cultivating coca leaves (Muñoz-Mora, 2010). In this
case study the author utilizes a stochastic production function: a model that analyzes the
inefficiency of coffee farmers in correlation to the violence rates in different Colombian regions.
The first significant observation that he makes, and contributes to my research, is the increasing
numbers of violent attacks in coffee growing regions. In these same regions there is also a
presence of coca cultivation. Through a series of graphs, he locates the regions that contain all
three overlapping characteristics. In his stochastic production function, he controlled a series of
variables that lead to his establishment that the presence of violent attacks in coffee growing
regions significantly reduced coffee production by 1.2 percent, in comparison to other coffee
growing regions without violence. The stochastic production function, also known as the
Stochastic frontier analysis, is a model for technical efficiency that are assumed to be a function
of a firm-specific variables and time. 7 The observable efficient variables will follow the frontier
and the inefficient variables are located within the frontier. Thus, he analyzes the efficiency of
coffee farming efficiency in relation to the variables of Colombia’s FedCafe and violence rates.
FedCafe is present in various locations throughout Colombia, and its presence resulted in

7
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positive impact on coffee production during the civil unrest (Muñoz-Mora, 2010). Overall, this
paper establishes a connection between violence rate in Colombia and its negative impact on
coffee bean production. This paper demonstrated that violence rates affected coffee bean

production, contrary to my hypothesis. The following article discusses the same relationship but
utilizes international coffee prices as an indicator for crime rate.
Rettberg (2010) discusses that violence in Colombia’s coffee growing regions is due to
the disruption in the International Coffee Agreement in 1989. She calls this disruption in prices
as the “Coffee Crisis,” that essentially diminished the price of coffee beans and led to an up rise
of coffee farmers (Rettberg, 2010). The International Coffee Organization (ICO), in
collaboration with FedCafe, failed to establish an international coffee price after the period of La
Violencia in the 1950’s (Rettberg, 2010). Rettberg (2010) discusses that the overall price shock
on coffee led farmers to cultivate the substitute crop, coca. Armed organizations had the
advantage in gaining access to the coffee growing farms because of Colombia's weak agricultural
economy (Rettberg, 2010).
It is reasonable that a weak state led armed groups to invade coffee bean farms, but I do
not necessarily agree with how she positions the relationship of crime as an indicator for coffee
growth. From the coca crop literature, Angrist and Kuglar (2008) and Holmes et al. (2006) state
that the cultivation of coca is the root of violent deaths. Since coffee beans and coca leafs are
substitute crops, it makes sense that the cultivation of either crop influences the violence
associated with armed groups. Thus, the following article by Dube and Varga (2006) analyzes
violent attacks contingent to coffee bean prices, coffee bean, and coca crop cultivation in
Colombia.
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An extension of Rettberg (2010)’s discussion and Angrist and Kuglar (2008)’s resource

curse, Dube and Varga (2006) examine what they call a resource curse in reverse by stating that
the exogenous coffee price shock influenced the violence rates in Colombia. They utilize a fixed
effect difference-in-difference model that analyzes the level of violence in coffee growing and
non-coffee growing regions before and after this “Coffee Crisis” (Dube & Varga, 2006). They
aggregate data for coffee prices, coffee growing departments, hectares dedicated for coffee
cultivation, hectares dedicated to coca cultivation, and poverty rates. Based on these variables,
their results show that average guerilla attacks in coffee-growing regions are about 0.55 and in
non-coffee growing regions they are about 0.47. However, for the purpose of this paper I will
only focus on the results affecting coffee growing regions. Post coffee crisis, the number of
attacks increased by 0.21 more than before, per municipality (Dube & Varga, 2006). This
increase is considered statistically significant at the one percent level. Ultimately, they conclude
that stabilizing the price of a primary commodity can influence violence rates in Colombia.
Additionally, they claim that institutions such as the ICO and FedCafe can strategically reduce
the level of violence if they can adequately compensate for an unexpected coffee crisis (Dube &
Varga, 2006).
Dube and Varga (2006)’s research provided an intriguing discussion of coffee bean and
coca crop hectares of cultivation on the level of crime rate. This is important for my paper
because it provides an avenue for me to continue the research on the relationship between coffee
bean production and the type of crime I want to highlight. My added contribution to the existing
literature is to analyze two types of homicide rates, massacres and selective assassinations, which
are two separate responses towards coca eradication exertions from the government.
Furthermore, I want to shed light on how coffee bean and coca leaves hectares of cultivation
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influence massacres and assassinations after the years 2000. Most of the literature discussed,
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focuses on information before the 2000's, or they look at only one year, so I will be using a panel
dataset that looks at multiple departments across various years. In the following methodology
section, I will discuss in the detail my data, analysis, and results.

IV. Methodology
Dube and Varga (2006) utilize a fixed effect difference-in-difference model to analyze
coffee production and political violence over time within a given municipality and they consider
the years 1998-2004. I will be analyzing the years 2002-2010, given the limited data on coffee
bean production per department. This paper will be an approximate to Dube and Varga (2006)’s
analysis of coffee bean production and armed conflict, but it will primarily focus on the specific
types of homicides that result of political violence in Colombia. I will also be utilizing a fixed
effects model on six Colombian departments that have overlapping events of homicide events,
coffee bean cultivation, and coca crop cultivation. The purpose of this section is determine
whether or not coffee bean cultivation area has an effect on massacres and assassinations
reported.
A. Sources of Data
I merged the following datasets: coffee bean hectares, coca leaf hectares, massacres, and
assassinations. I acquired the coffee bean data from FedCafe, because it provides the total
hectares of land dedicated to coffee beans from 2002-2014. 8 The data provided by FedCafe is
mainly in Spanish, so I translated the department’s name and headers of the file. Colombia has a
total of 32 departments, 22 of those departments cultivate coffee beans, and 16 have available

8

1 Hectare = 2.47 acres of land
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coffee bean production data. The total number of coffee producing departments demonstrates
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the vitality of this industry to Colombia’s overall agricultural economy. From the list of the
coffee producing departments, I only selected six departments that dedicated the largest hectares
of land to cultivate coffee beans: Antioquia, Caldas, Cauca, Huila, Tolima, and Cauca Valley
(see appendix 1). These six departments are located in the Andean and Pacific region of the
country. 9
I collected the coca crop data from the database from Empirical Studies of Conflict
(ESOC), they gather a series of public surveys in order to gain a better understanding of
Colombia’s civil conflict. The coca leaf data also measures the total hectares of land dedicated to
growing coca leaves, based on aerial survey and ground inspections. Since the Colombian
government has deemed the coca crop as an illicit product, farmers are more cautious of growing
coca, thus coca crop data is difficult to collect. Ibanez & Carlsson (2010) state that farmers are
willing to take a risk for higher profits by cultivating their coca crops with other crops in order to
avoid detection. The coca leaf data was available on municipality level, so I identified every
municipality to its corresponding department and group each of them by their respective year. A
total of 23 departments had a record of growing coca leaves within the time range 2001-2010. Of
these departments, I selected those departments that overlap with the six coffee cultivating
departments. However, only four had records of coca crops: Antioquia, Caldas, Cauca, and
Cauca Valley. Huila and Tolima did not have any record of producing coca, but they did have a
record of crimes. Unlike Holmes et al. (2006) who analyzes the four departments with the
highest cultivation of coca leaves, I analyze the four departments that overlap with the
departments with the highest coffee bean cultivation area. The reason for doing this, is to identify

9

Refer to appendix 2, to see a visual of the departments.
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whether or not coffee bean production has a significant effect on the crimes committed in these
six departments.

The same six coffee-growing departments also face a series of crimes; however, the two
types of crime I have chosen for this study are massacres and selective assassinations. I acquired
the two data sets through the database Basta Ya. 10 Basta Ya, Spanish for “Enough Already”, is a
unique database that collects news reports that record infliction of violence on the Colombian
population from 1980-2012. In each file, the authors include information such as location of the
event, the parties involved, the number of victims, and the news source. This database is also in
Spanish, so I translated the given information and description of events. As previously stated, I
want to research the crime data in detail, specifically death. Death is one the main results of the
violent conflict between the guerilla, the paramilitary, and government (Holmes et al., 2006).
Whether death occurs in a rural or urban area, death brings economic hardship to any community
(Angrist & Kuglar, 2008).
According to Basta Ya, massacres is defined as the murder of four or more defenseless
people through public display, in order to perpetuate fear amongst the public by armed groups.
Meanwhile, selective assassinations are defined as the murder of three or less defenseless people,
also a result of the civil conflict. Both datasets mention the type of armed group involved with
the incident; therefore, I categorized each crime in accordance to the parties involved, if
available. Each crime has been filtered through the years 2002-2012, and by the six departments.
For massacres, the predominant groups involved with the incidences are the paramilitary groups,
guerrilla organization FARC, and the public force (see appendix 3). Meanwhile, the predominant

10
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groups involved with assassinations are non-identified paramilitary groups, guerilla organization

FARC, and the national army, and under each group there are sub-parties that have specific titles
(see appendix 4).
B. Descriptive statistics
The following graph show the sum of both selective assassinations and massacres over 8
years. According to Graph 1, selective assassinations is greater in comparison to the sum
massacres. This is intriguing because selective assassinations account for the death of 3 people
or less, while massacres accounts for the death of 4 people or more. This demonstrates that
overall selective assassinations occur more often than massacres over the 8 years.
Graph 1
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In Graph 2, we see both types of homicide in accordance to the six departments, and one
can see that it follows a similar trend to the Graph 1. The sum of assassination continues to be
predominant in the six departments. Furthermore, an interesting figure is the concentration of
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homicides in Antioquia compared to the rest of the departments. This is due to the size of the
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department. Antioquia is larger thus it inhabits a greater population.
Graph 2
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It is interesting to note that in Graph 1, there is a decreasing trend in the total number of
homicides reported over the years. This decrease can be explained by Graph 3. There is an
inverse relationship between coffee bean hectares of cultivation and the sum of massacres and
selective assassinations over the 8-year time frame. 11 The decrease in homicides can also be
explained by other factors, such as the election of a new president, Alvaro Uribe. Throughout his
presidency, there have been many “peace” talks between the armed groups and government
officials, but nothing definitive to end the conflict completely. In 2007, there is a series of
hostage situations that take place between FARC and the Colombian government. 12 These
hostage situations mainly affected government officials and political ties with neighboring
countries. Meanwhile in the coffee bean industry, after the 2000’s there is stabilization in the

11
12

On the right side of the graph, the secondary axis accounts for the sum for hectares of land
Key Events in Colombia, n.d.
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international coffee bean prices after the “Coffee Crisis” that occurred during the 90’s. Thus,
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according to the World Bank (2003) report, there is a strong effort to promote the growth of
coffee bean trees throughout the country. Furthermore, it is also important to recognize that the
size of a department maybe skewing the total sum of massacres and selective assassinations,
such as Antioquia. Many events can account for the trends that appear in Graph 3, yet through
my regression analysis the trends can be explained.
Graph 3
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Table 1 is the summary statistics of the four variables I am analyzing. One can see that
coffee bean hectares of cultivation is indeed greater then coca leaf hectares. The largest hectares
cultivated in a given year was 154,983 hectares, and the minimum was 65,681 hectares which
shows that Colombia dedicates large amounts of land to the production of this crop.
Additionally, the maximum hectares of coca cultivated was 8,157 hectares, which is rather a
large amount of land, but small in comparison to coffee cultivation.

26

Coffee Bean, Coca Leaf, and Crime in Colombia

The max number of massacres for a given municipality and year is 24. It is evident that

mass murder perpetuates fear among any community that is why it is important to analyze what
triggers such events. The average number of selective assassinations between 2002 and 2012 is
1.39 deaths. The average selective assassinations should be less than 1.39, because according to
the database selective assassinations range from 1-3 individuals murdered, and in Table 1 the
max number of assassinations are 5 individuals. Thus, the highest number of individuals
murdered should be 3 and not 5.
Table 1
Variable

Mean

Coffee Bean

97840.52

Coca
Massacres
Assassinations

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

23247.9

65681.16

154982.9

2406.38

2526.71

0

8157

5.3

2.46

4

24

1.39

.66

1

5

C. Models
I use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model to analyze my data. Based on
the literature of coffee bean production in relation to coca leaf production for model 1, I
hypothesize that an increase in 𝛾𝛾1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 will decrease the number of deaths for

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 present in the six departments. I assume that the land available to cultivate coca
crops, will be used to cultivate coffee beans instead, thus decreasing the affiliation to armed

organizations and overall reducing homicides. Meanwhile, an increase in 𝛾𝛾2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 production

will increase 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 because farmers will become affiliated with armed group operations,

thus increasing the probability of being murder. For model 2, I hypothesize that 𝜌𝜌1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

will also decrease the number of deaths for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, while an increase in
𝜌𝜌2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 will increase 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. The setup of my model is as follows.
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OLS Model
Model 1:
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛾𝛾2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛿𝛿
Model 2:

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜌𝜌0 + 𝜌𝜌1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜌𝜌2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜎𝜎
Where:

1) 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = dependent variable for model 1; measured in the number of individual
deaths

2) 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = dependent variable for model 2; measured in the number of
individual deaths

3) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = independent variable; measured in hectares of land used to cultivate
coffee beans

4) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = independent variable; measured in hectares of land used to cultivate coca leaves

5) 𝛿𝛿 and 𝜎𝜎 = the error term in model 1 and 2
VARIABLES
coffeebean
coca
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Table 2
(1)
Massacres

0.00119**
(0.000510)
-0.00547
(0.00474)
-70.02
(43.02)

(2)
assassinations
0.00216***
(0.000474)
-0.00270
(0.00427)
-133.5***
(40.09)

28
36
0.185
0.435
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2 demonstrates the following results for model 1, holding all else constant, a onehectare increase of 𝛾𝛾1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 will increase 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 by 0.00119 and it is significant at

the 5% alpha level. Meanwhile, holding all else constant, a one-hectare increase in 𝛾𝛾2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 will

decrease 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 by 0.00547, but it is not significant. In model 2, holding all else constant, a
one-hectare increase in 𝜌𝜌1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, will increase 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 by 0.00216,
and it is significant at the 1% alpha level. A one-hectare increase in 𝜌𝜌2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 will decrease
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 by 0.0027, but again it is not significant at any alpha level.

According to the OLS results, there is a positive correlation between coffee bean

production and massacre and assassinations, meaning that crime will continue to increase if
hectares of coffee bean increases. If coffee bean production increased by 1,000 hectares of
cultivation, massacres would increase by 1.19 deaths, and selective assassinations would increase
by 2.16 deaths. The increase in death is less than the average for both massacres and selective
assassination so the increase it not relatively high. Therefore, the OLS model may not be the
best measure for analyzing the relationship between coffee bean cultivation and homicides.
Limitations of OLS Model
The OLS model does not take into account the differences in population size for each
department. For instance, Antioquia is relatively larger in population size in comparison to the
other departments, thus there are more victims of crime. Acquiring population data to control for
this was difficult to obtain. Colombia’s census data does not provide consecutive annual data on
population for each department; therefore, I could not include population as a control variable in
my regression analysis (see appendix 5). Climate is also another variable that I intended to
control; however, the Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology, and Environmental Studies (IDEAM)
only provides monthly averages for the time frame 1981-2010 (see appendix 6). Therefore, it is
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difficult to match the rainfall to the given years 2002-2012. Because I lack the necessary data
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that would control for these variables, I utilize a fixed effect model in order to control for
observable and unobservable variations.
Fixed Effects Models
The fixed effects model controls for the variation within department and year, hence the
next two models hold different results in comparison to the OLS models. For model 3, I also
hypothesize that an increase in 𝛼𝛼1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 will decrease the number of deaths for

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Meanwhile, an increase in 𝛼𝛼2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 production will increase the number of

deaths for 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . In model 4, I hypothesize that 𝛽𝛽1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 will decrease the

number of deaths for 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , while an increase in 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 will increase
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
Model 3:

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
Model 4:

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
Where:

1. Subscript i = variation within department (state)
2. Subscript t = variation in time
3. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = dependent variable for model 3; measures the number of
individual deaths with control for variation within department and year

4. 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = dependent variable for model 4; measures the

number of individual deaths with control for variation within department and year
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5. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = independent variable; measured in hectares with control for
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variation within department and year

6. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = independent variable; measured in hectares with control for variation
within department and year

7. 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 and 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = captures variation within department

8. 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 = captures variation within time, dummy variable represents years
2002-2010

9. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = the error term in model 3 and 4
VARIABLES

Table 3
(3)
Massacres

(4)
assassinations

coffeebean

-0.00322
0.000324
(0.00460)
(0.00278)
coca
-0.0140
-0.00311
(0.00940)
(0.00847)
Observations
28
36
R-squared
0.566
0.546
Number of Dept
4
4
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in the fixed effect model indicate that coffee bean cultivation does not have
any significant effect on the homicidal rates in Colombia. Table 3 demonstrates that after
controlling for all 8 years, there is no significance amongst any independent variable. 13 In model
3, a one-thousand-hectare increase of coffee beans will decrease massacres by 3.22 deaths and an
increase in a one-thousand-hectare of coca cultivation will also decrease massacres by 14 deaths,
but neither variable is significant. In model 4, a one-thousand-hectare increase in coffee bean

13

See appendix 7 for a full view of the table with the dummy variables
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will increase selective assassinations by 0.324 of a death, while a one-thousand-hectare increase
in coca cultivation will decrease selective assassinations by 3.11 deaths, yet no significance.
The numbers seem to take a wide range when both crops increase, since the average number of
massacres are 5.3 deaths and the average selective assassinations are 1.39 deaths.

Overall, the results show that there is no correlation between coffee beans and massacres,
and coffee beans and selective assassinations. Furthermore, there is no correlation between coca
crops and massacres, and coca crops and selective assassinations. An explanation for the nonsignificance between the independent and dependent coefficients is explained in the variation
within each year. Within each year there are contributing factors that influence the fluctuation of
homicides per department. The baseline for the regression is 2002, and as the years progress
there is a significant decrease of massacres and selective assassinations. One of those factors
could be the introduction of the new president Alvaro Uribe to the country in 2002. President
Alvaro may have had political influence on massacres and selective assassinations throughout
the 8 years, thus decreasing the homicide rate.
Another possible explanation for the non-significance maybe due to variation in the
sample size of the variables. Therefore, I take the log of the coffee bean and coca leaf variables
and conduct another regression (see appendix 9). In this regression, the results for both logged
variables have almost the same results as the regressions for model 3 and 4, except for log of
coca and selective assassinations. Again, these results are not significant meaning that there is
no correlation between coffee beans, coca leafs, and the two types of homicides.
The overall correlation between coffee bean and coca leaf is 0.537, positive and a rather
strong correlation. Because these two crops are strongly correlated, I conducted two more
regressions separate from each other (see appendix 11-13). Once again there is no significance
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between coffee beans, coca leafs, and the two homicides. However, the dummy variables have a
significant correlation to massacres and selective assassinations. The baseline year of analysis is
2002 and as dummy years progress, massacres and selective assassinations significantly
decrease. Therefore, this indicates that the decrease in homicides is linked to the variation in
each year and not coffee bean cultivation, as stated previously.
Dube and Varga (2006)’s analysis of coffee bean production and armed conflict
demonstrate that a higher value of coffee beans in the international market decreases violent
conflict, but a decrease in the international price of coffee bean triggers violence in Colombia.
They analyze the price of coffee bean production and not simply the hectares of cultivation.

Their overall results suggest that coffee bean production decreases violence rates, a result similar
to model 3 where coffee bean production decreases massacres but not selective assassinations, if
it were statistically significant. Dube and Varga (2006)’s analysis of coca crop as a substitute
crop fails to explain the increase and decrease of violence rates in Colombia. My results for
model 3 and 4 also fail to explain the decrease in homicides when coca cultivations of hectares
increase since there is no significance between the two variables.
Limitations
Overall, coffee bean production does not have a significant effect on the homicide rate in
the six Colombian departments. The model I used in this paper is a simple one due to the
difficulty in obtaining the necessary data from the Colombian department of statistics. If given
additional data, the model can be further expanded to provide an analysis of other contributing
factors to homicides in Colombia. Such factors include coffee bean prices per department, coca
crop prices per department if available, and controlling for weather in each department.
Additionally, one could either expand the number of departments observed or potentially look at
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the violence rate in non-coffee growing departments. An inclusion of these variables would
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further explain the relationship between coffee bean production and crime rate in Colombia.
Analyzing municipality-level data may provide a better understanding of how coffee
bean cultivation affects each municipality involved with the production, because some
municipalities may heavily rely on the product while others may not. The terrain varies
throughout the country thus select municipalities may have an advantage over the production,
while other municipalities may focus on a different product. It would also help to focus on one
coffee-growing municipality per department instead of look at a whole department, because
some departments vary in size, therefore skewing the number of observations in the dataset.
Hence, municipality-level analysis can have different results in comparison to the departmentallevel analysis.

V. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to determine whether coffee bean cultivation has a
significant effect on crime rate in Colombia. After utilizing a series of fixed effect regression
models, the results indicate that coffee bean production did not have a significant effect on either
massacres or selective assassinations. Aggregate departmental data indicate that other factors
influence the level of homicides across the years 2002-2010, and coffee bean production does
not solely affect departmental homicides. Coffee bean crops seem like the ideal alternative
method of cultivation, because for one it is the substitute crop for coca leaves, secondly it already
has an established presence in Colombia's agricultural economy, and lastly the organization of
Colombian Coffee Bean Growers Federation financially supports small scale farmers who grow
traditional coffee.
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Future of Coffee Bean Production
A potential avenue to research is the upcoming trend of fair trade coffee in Latin
America. Colombia is one of the largest producers of coffee, so the introduction of organic
coffee beans can potentially provide farmers bargaining power to maximize their profits and
lessen the cultivation of coca leaves. Fair-trade coffee beans can add to the supply of traditional
coffee beans and further strengthen Colombia's agricultural economy. Garcia-Yi (2012) analyzes
the production of organic coffee been in Peru, and demonstrates that farmers are more willingly
to cultivate organic coffee beans over coca leaves. Thus, organic coffee beans can potentially
serve as an alternative development crop.
Case Study - Guatemala
As mentioned in the literature review, Garcia-Yi (2014)’s and Ibanez and Carlsson
(2010)’s research indicate that farmers are more responsive to profit maximizing crops. This
past spring break, I had the opportunity to tour a local organic coffee farm in San Miguel
Escobar, Guatemala. This local farm is supported through a cooperative called As Green As It
Gets, an organization that funds sustainable economic development and organic coffee trade
(History, n.d.). A family of eight cultivated an organic coffee farm on a volcano slope, and I had
the opportunity to ask the two brothers, who were our tour guides, a few questions in regards to
their farm's production. I first asked why they cultivated large hectares of coffee bean, as
opposed to other crops, and they answered that they would cultivate any crop that was
marketable and provided high revenues. Previous to the coffee farm, they had cultivated beans
and yucca roots, 14 so they cleared their lands to cultivate organic coffee beans and meet the

14

A type of potato common in Latin America
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(2010)’s research, these farmers were motivated through economic incentives, despite if the
product was an illicit crop. I followed up by asking them whether or not they would cultivate
coca leaves despite its negative attributes, and they responded by stating that if there was a local
market and demand for coca leaves, they would also cultivate it on their farm without a doubt.
Again demonstrating that famers react to profit incentives, more so if they have an organization
that supports their production.

Policy Implications: Plan Colombia
Many authors, politicians, and activists debate that a more efficient alternative
development program, one better than Plan Colombia, is necessary to halt the cultivation of coca
leaves and diminish the level of crime (Holmes et al., 2006). A segment of Plan Colombia
requires manual eradication of crops throughout the Colombia terrain, which can be difficult
because most of the production derives from mountain slopes and high altitudes of 4.900 feet in
elevation. 15 As a result, Colombian officials encourage farmers to cultivate alternative crops
such as bananas and cacao, yet the production of these products are not as profitable, and
transportation for the harvest can be difficult in mountainous terrain (Miroff, 2015). The
effectiveness of this policy is constantly debated because of its unsuccessful rates and lack of
peace between Colombian government and armed groups in negotiating treaties. Colombia is
made up of complex terrains and this is a natural barrier that keeps the country from uniting.
Communities lack communication from one another. Thus, in order for a policy such as Plan
Colombia to be successful, the policy should appeal to the smaller communities based on their

15

Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Processing. (2005); Miroff, (2015)

Coffee Bean, Coca Leaf, and Crime in Colombia
local economies. Eradicating coca leaf crops will not resolve the armed conflict in Colombia,
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but if the United States invested that military aid to reduce the addiction of cocaine in their
country, then it would reduce the demand for cocaine. As a result, it would reduce the supply
coca leaves cultivated in Latin American countries.
Overall, it seems that farmers are motivated through different economic incentives, so
recommending one solution to Colombia's violence-stricken economy seems almost impossible
to obtain. Since coca leafs originate from rural locations, studying Colombian farmer’s behavior
can provide a better understanding of their local economies and personal choices. For this
reason, it is important for scholars to continue studying the different methods and approaches
that can potentially decrease the violence in Colombia, and provide a safety net for farmers who
are vulnerable to the armed conflict. Through academic literature, policy officials can identify
the best methods that could alleviate Colombia's civil conflict.
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